Two different issues arise when the American experience in Vietnam is considered in the context of the Nuremberg trials and related international conventions: the issue of "legality" and the issue of justice. The first is a technical question of law and history-by the standards of international law as formally accepted by the great powers, how is the American war in Indochina to be judged? The second question is more elusive. It is the question of proper standards. Are the principles of Nuremberg and related international law satisfactory and appropriate in the case of great power intervention as in Vietnam and Czechoslovalia, for example? The recent study of Nuremberg and Vietnam by Telford Taylor-the chief counsel for the prosecution at Nuremberg, a historian, professor of law, and retired Brigadier-General-is devoted to the first of these topics, but occasional remarks bear on the second as well. It is possible that Taylor's brief but informative study will set the framework for much of the subsequent debate over war crimes and broader questions of proper international conduct. Though conservative in assumptions and narrow in compass-overly so, in my opinionTaylor's investigation leads to strong conclusions. He comes close to suggesting that the military and civilian leadership of the United States during the period from 1965 to the present are liable to prosecution as war criminals, under the standards of Nuremberg. No less controversial are the self-imposed limitations of his study. In many respects, Taylor's book offers a convenient point of departure for an investigation of the issues of legality and justice.
I. "War Crimes" and "Justice"
The issue of justice is not to be discounted. International law is in effect a body of moral principles accepted as valid by those who ratify treaties and other agreements. Furthermore, as Taylor emphasizes, treaties and manuals "are only partial embodiments of the laws of war." The preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention, for example, states that questions not covered should be resolved by "the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience."'. It therefore makes sense to inquire into the acceptability as well as the political and social content of such principles as have been codified and generally adopted, and to consider them in the light of the dictates of public conscience and the laws of humanity, unclear as these may be. As to "usages established among civilized peoples," Justice Jackson, in an interim report to the President in 1945, wrote that " [w] e are put under a heavy responsibility to see that our behavior during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought toward a firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct, so as to make war less attractive to those who have governments and the destinies of peoples in their power." 2 How have we met this responsibility in the postwar era? The question touches not only on the legality of American conduct in the light of Nuremberg and related principles, but also on the character of these principles themselves.
Taylor's discussion of the Nuremberg judgments reveals a fundamental moral flaw in the principles which emerged from those trials. Rejecting the argument that the bombing of North Vietnam constitutes a war crime, Taylor observes that " [w] hatever the laws of war in this field ought to be, certainly Nuremberg furnishes no basis for these accusations." 3 Yet this bombing has laid waste most of North Vietnam, including large cities with the exceptions of Hanoi and Haiphong. 4 The reason the law of war crimes does not reach American bombing is straightforward:
Since both sides [in World War II] had played the terrible game of urban destruction-the Allies far more successfully-there was no basis for criminal charges against Germans or Japanese, and in fact no such charges were brought. 5 Aerial bombardment had been used so extensively and ruthlessly on the Allied side as well as the Axis side that neither at Nuremberg nor Tokyo was the issue made a part of the trials. 0 Similarly, charges against German Admirals for violating the London Naval Treaty of 1930 were dismissed after testimony by Admiral Nimitz, which "established that in this regard the Germans had done nothing that the British and Americans had not also done." 7 The Nuremberg
Tribunal ruled that the German admirals should be subjected to no criminal penalties for their violation of international law, because the laws in question "had been abrogated by the practice of the belligerents on both sides under the stress of military necessity." 8 Taylor concludes that " [t] o punish the foe-especially the vanquished foe-for conduct in which the enforcing nation has engaged, would be so grossly inequitable as to discredit the laws themselves." 9 From such comments we can derive the operational definition of "crime of war" as conceived at Nuremberg. "Criminal acts" were to be actually treated as crimes only if the defeated enemy, but not the victors, had engaged in them. No doubt it would be "grossly inequitable" to punish the vanquished foe for conduct in which the enforcing nation has engaged. It would, however, be just and equitable to punish both victor and vanquished for their criminal acts. This option, which Taylor does not mention, was not adopted by the postwar Tribunals either. The Tribunals instead chose "to discredit the laws themselves" by restricting their definition of criminal conduct in such a way as to exclude punishment of the victors. 10 observations in the neighborhood of Hanoi, I join the North Vietnamese in "not believing it." Nor do I think that Sheehan would "believe it" if he were to walk through the ruins of Phu Ly or Thanh Hoa, let alone the much more heavily bombed areas farther from Hanoi. Nevertheless, the bombing of North Vietnam, despite its enormous scale, has been well below that of South Vietnam and Laos in intensity and destructiveness.
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The conclusion that Nuremberg is to be understood as the judgment of victors, rather than as the achievement of a new level of international morality, is reinforced by Taylor's discussion of aggressive war. The distinctive contribution of Nuremberg, he points out, was to establish the category of crimes against peace: "Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances," or "participation in a common plan or conspiracy" to this end." "In terms of substantive international law," Taylor writes, "and in the mind of the general public, the salient feature of the Nuremberg trials was the decision that individuals could be held guilty for participation in the planning and waging of 'a war of aggression.' "1' "Indisputably it was a cardinal part of the postwar policy of the United States Government to establish the criminality under international law of aggressive warfare .... (1966) . The documentary record so far released shows that the publicly available evidence was sufficient to determine the main lines of American policy. Space limits prevent discussion here. However, these documents would appear to provide direct evidence of a conspiracy to wage an expanding war of aggression and to violate the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding pacific settlement of disputes. that would unlock the secret files." '15 But if only access to the secret files can provide proof that aggressive war has been waged, then it follows that the "salient feature of the Nuremberg trials" will normally be relevant only to the case of an enemy that has suffered total military defeat.
Actually, Taylor vacillates somewhat on the matter of proof of aggression, in that he seems to trust the executive branch to make unilateral judgments regarding aggression by other states, despite the "insuperable" evidentiary problems. He writes that "until 1965 [he] supported American intervention in Vietnam as an aggression-checking undertaking in the spirit of the United Nations Charter ... ."10 It was in Taylor's opinion permissible for the American Executive to determine unilaterally that North Vietnam was engaged in aggressive war prior to 1965, and to join South Vietnam in collective self-defense against the armed attack from the North, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. So uniquely competent is the United States to exercise this judgment, he seems to believe, that is was unnecessary even to adhere to the provision in Article 51 that measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defense be immediately reported to the Security Council, 17 or to the provision in Article 39 that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and shall determine what measures shall be taken.
In fact, I think that Taylor exaggerates the "evidentiary problems" of determining whether the United States is engaged in aggression in Southeast Asia, just as he underestimates the difficulty of establishing that it was engaged in collective self-defense against armed attack. His discussion of aggressive war seems to me inadequate in other respects as well, a matter to which I return below.
There is a still more serious issue at stake when we consider the acceptability of the principles of international law as codified in the Charter of Nuremberg and elsewhere. These principles were formu- The Rule of Force in International Affairs lated by representatives of established governments, without the participation of representatives of mass-based popular movements that seek to overthrow recognized governments or that establish revolutionary governments. Richard Falk holds that "from the perspective of international order the capacity to govern is certainly an element in claiming political legitimacy," 18 and Thomas J. Farer speaks of "the dangerous ambiguity of just when the insurgency has achieved sufficient status to require equal treatment."' 9 This point is crucial in assessing Taylor's belief that the United States was engaged in an "aggressionchecking" undertaking in Vietnam, say, in 1962 . In that year American officials in Saigon estimated that half the population supported the NLF. 20 27. Even Douglas Pike, who is often hardly more than a propagandist for the Amer. ican government, admits that the NLF constituted the only "mass-based political party in South Vietnam" and that in late 1964, it was impossible for the American-stpported government to consider a coalition with the NLF, for fear that "the whale would swallow the minnow." D. PIKE, VIET CONG 110, 861-62 (1966 terpretation of the currently prevailing system of international law, then the only appropriate conclusion is that this system of law is to be disregarded as without moral force. Or, to be more precise, the conclusion must be that this system of law is simply a device for ratifying imperial practice.
These questions do not arise in any direct way in Taylor's discussion, in part because he scarcely touches on the pre-1965 period to which they are directly relevant. Similar problems, however, are implicit in his discussion of the legality of various modes of warfare. As already noted, Taylor argues that aerial warfare is not intrinsically unlawful, although the "silence of Nuremberg" on this matter raises questions "especially relevant to American bombing policies ... in South Vietnam." 2 9 The routine destruction of villages by American firepower and ground sweeps and the forced evacuation of population are, he argues, of doubtful legality, and reprisal attacks against villages harboring Vietcong-official policy, as he notes-are a "flagrant violation" of the Geneva Convention. 0 What is more, Taylor believes the establishment of free-fire zones to be illegal 3 1 But Taylor emphasizes the great problems in determining how legal principles should apply under the circumstances of Vietnam, where a superpower is using its technological resources to destroy guerrilla forces that conceal themselves among the population. The basic problem is this:
The enemy does not respect those laws, the terrain lends itself to clandestine operations in which women and children frequently participate, the hostile and the friendly do not label themselves as such, and individuals of the yellow race are hard for our soldiers to identify. As in the Philippines 65 years ago, our troops are thousands of miles from home in uncomfortable, dangerous and unfamiliar surroundings. No one not utterly blind to the realities can fail to acknowledge and make allowance for the difficulties and uncertainties they face in distinguishing inoffensive noncombatants from hostile partisans.
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The enemy "is undeniably in violation of the traditional laws of war and the Geneva Conventions, based as they are on the distinction between combatants and noncombatants" in two specific respects: the enemy does not wear "a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance" or "carry arms openly," as American soldiers do. The law, and presumably in Laos and Cambodia as well. These laws, so understood, are the weapon of the strong, and are of no moral force or validity. It is a political decision to accept an interpretation of the law which holds that a government installed and maintained by a foreign power (as in South Vietnam or Hungary) has the right to call upon this foreign power to suppress an insurgency that has gained such extensive political support that insurgents are indistinguishable from the population, and which holds that civilian participants in the insurgency are war criminals. It is a political decision to accept as valid the law that combatants must identify themselves as such to the soldiers of the foreign army, while that same law raises no objection to the dispatch of soldiers "thousands of miles from home" to "unlovely circumstances" in which they cannot distinguish noncombatants from partisans.
Though Taylor is quite right to insist on the difficulties and uncertainties faced by these troops, there is no reason to withhold condemnation from the political leaders who sent them there, or to grant any validity to the legal system that permits this while condemning the enemy's recipe for victory: winning popular support and using this support in the only way a popular movement can to overthrow the local 37. B. FALL, STr= WniouTr Joy 372-73 (1964) .
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representatives of a foreign superpower. No reason, that is, apart from the political judgment that a great power has the right to impose a regime of its choice, by force, in some foreign land. The system of law, so interpreted, is merely a ratification of imperialist practice.
Though Taylor is not entirely explicit, it seems that he accepts the political judgment that the United States has the right to impose the regime of its choice in South Vietnam. In his discussion of war aims, he refers to "our stated policy," namely, "to gain and hold the political allegiance of the South Vietnamese to a non-communist government, while giving them defensive assistance against any military means used by the North." 9 His only stated objection to this policy is that it was unlikely to work, under the circumstances of Vietnam. As to the "defensive assistance" against the North, surely he is aware that the main NLF fighting units were indigenous from the start, and remained so until the United States internationalized the war. He apparently believes that it was legitimate for the United States to introduce its military forces, as it did in the early 1960s, to gain and hold the political allegiance of the South Vietnamese to the non-communist government installed by the United States in 1954. Taylor refers to the "deeply idealistic strain in the American interventionist tradition," 40 as when McKinley justified the war against Spain in 1898. This is a very superficial historical judgment. Virtually every imperial power has justified its actions on "idealistic" grounds. This was true of the British and French empires, the Japanese in East Asia, 41 and the Russians in Eastern Europe. That the leaders and populations of the imperial powers may even succumb to these delusions is hardly significant. It is remarkable that the standards by which we would judge other cases of imperial intervention seem so difficult to comprehend when applied to our own actions. Taylor asks whether the American conduct of the war, with forced resettlement, complicity in the torture of prisoners, enthusiasm for body counts, devastation of large areas to expose the insurgents, free-fire zones, and the Son My massacre, was merely "a terrible, mad aberration." 43 He answers correctly that in part it was a consequence of the specific features of the Vietnam war cited above, which make the laws of war so difficult to apply. In fact, the policy of forced resettlement and devastation of large areas of the country was a rational, perhaps even a necessary response to the specific circumstances of the Vietnam war. Bernard Fall, bitterly anti-communist and a strong supporter of the American war before it reached its full fury, explained this fact very well in the early 1960s.
Why is it that we must use top-notch elite forces, the cream of the crop of American, British, French, or Australian commando and special warfare schools; armed with the very best that advanced technology can provide; to defeat Viet-Minh, Algerians, or Malay "CT's" [Chinese terrorists], almost none of whom can lay claim to similar expert training and only in the rarest of cases to equality in fire power?
The answer is very simple: It takes all the technical proficiency our system can provide to make up for the woeful lack of popular support and political savvy of most of the regimes that the West has thus far sought to prop up. The Americans who are now fighting in South Viet-Nam have come to appreciate this fact out of first-hand experence.
Today, there is vastly more evidence to support Fall's conclusion. "The element of real popular support is vital," he wrote. 40 And it was exactly this "real popular support" that led Washington to adopt the policy of forced population removal that has reduced the peasantry from about eighty-five per cent to less than half of the population, "criticize what it regards as mistakes in [Amnerican] strategy or policy," or to publish "bitter attacks on Vietcong atrocities .....
Id. True objectivity. The columnit also prides himself on his "sophistication" for "printing one of the few editorials which attempted to establish a sympathetic understanding for the troops who took part in the massacre at My Lai," id., failing to note that the American peace movement, which he denounces, had almost universally taken the same position, but without glor)inig in its sophistication for this normal human response.
43. P. 152i 44. wFuL, supra note 36, at 373. Note that thit %%s written in the early 1960s, at a time when Taylor "supported American intervention in Vietnam as an aggression.checking undertaking in the spirit of the United Nations Charter." P. 20G. Three years after this work appeared, Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before Congress that the Vieteong and the North Vietnamese were "operating,. . without, for all practical purposes, a single wheeled vefifle in all of South Vietnam." Sed the statement by Senator 1'roxmire, M'7 eoNO. R. S4585 (daily ed. Apt. 5, 1971). 45. B. FAL., supra note 36, at 378. while laying waste the countryside. If international law has nothing to say about this (except that civilians aiding the resistance are war criminals), then its moral bankruptcy is revealed.
II. "War Crimes" In Vietnam
The major topic that Taylor considers, however, is the more narrow question of the legality of American actions in Vietnam when measured against the framework of Nuremberg and related conventions. In his analysis of the American intervention after 1965, Taylor concludes that there is definite evidence that war crimes have been committed and that culpability for these crimes extends to high levels of military command and civilian leadership. The evidence in this regard is extensive.
The primary example that Taylor considers is the My Lai massacre. Dr. Alje Vennema, director of a Canadian hospital near the site of the massacre, reports that he knew of it at once but did nothing because it was not at all out of the ordinary. His patients were constantly reporting such incidents to him. The province of Quang Ngai, in which My Lai is located, had been virtually destroyed. Half the population had been forced into refugee camps, and children were starving and wounded. 48 Colonel Oran Henderson, the highest-ranking officer now facing court-martial charges for the My Lai massacre, states that "every unit of brigade size has its Mylai hidden some place," though "every unit doesn't have a Ridenhour." 47 This observation is borne out by direct testimony of veterans throughout the country. To cite just a few random examples, a highly decorated helicopter gunner testified in El Paso, Texas on May 5, 1971 , that of the thirty-nine Vietnamese he had killed, one was an old man 46 riding a bicycle and ten were a group of unarmed civilians. In each case, he claims to have acted on direct order from his commanding officer. A former member of the Coast Guard testified that his orders were to pilot a small motorboat through Delta canals shooting randomly into every village to see if there were inhabitants. In hearings conducted by the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry on United States War Grimes, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 1-3, 1970, a Medic in the 101st Airborne Division testified that approximately twenty-seven civilians in a peaceful meeting were killed in an unprovoked attack by American tanks firing a barrage of tiny arrow-like nails. A Marine forward observer testified that he counted twenty dead civilians after an unprovoked artillery strike on two villages. Another Marine corporal testified that his unit was ordered to fire on starving civilians scavenging in a garbage dump after their food supplies had been destroyed in 1966--rice fields had been napalmed to destroy food in this free-fire zone. A former Army sergeant testified before an unofficial House committee headed by Rep A former helicopter gunner with 176 confirmed "kills" told reporter Joseph Lelyveld that his gunship was ordered to halt a flight of peasants. When the pilot reported that he had no way to do so, he received orders to "shoot them." Thirty or forty unarmed villagers were then killed by the gunship. Trainees said that their instructor had written President Nixon after the Calley verdict about his own involvement in an incident in which six gunships attacked a village after a helicopter crew member had been shot, the gunships killing 350 villagers.5 0 Refugees, reporters and other observers have presented voluminous substantiating evidence. What is particularly important is that these episodes appear to be quite routine:
I have personally accompanied a routine operation in which U.S. 1469 village in territory controlled by the National Liberation Front, They also shot the villagers who ran out of the houses. This was termed "prepping the area" by the American lieutenant colonel who directed the operation. "We sort of shoot it up to see if anything moves," he explained, and he added by way of reassurance that this treatment was perfectly routine.0"
An official map of the 25th Infantry Division delineates large areas subjected to artillery and air bombardment prior to the ground sweeps of Operation Junction City in 1967. Within these areas there were over twenty identifiable villages with a population of 5000, according to earlier census figures. N.Y. Times correspondent R. W. Apple writes that he heard the "mere gook rule," according to which "anything that moves and has a yellow skin is an enemy, unless there is incontrovertible evidence to the contrary," repeated "100 times by majors and sergeants and privates." This, he writes, is "official policy, a part of everyday life." He goes on:
Not so evident to the average rifleman, but clear enough to those of us who have had an opportunity to travel about the country, is a deliberate policy of creating refugees wherever possible. An Army general , . . explained the idea to me as follows: "You've got to dry up the sea the guerrillas swim in-that's the peasantsand the best way to do that is blast the hell out of their villages so they'll come into our refugee camps. No villages, no guerrillas: simple,
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He adds further that Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, as well as Presidents Johnson and Nixon, surely knew this.5 3
It is this policy of "no villages, no guerrillas"-the policy of destroying the rural society-that is referred to as "forced-draft urbanization and modernization" by some of the more cynical academic technocrats who deal with Vietnam: "a euphemism to end all euphemisms,"" 4 as 53. Apple, supra note 92.
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Taylor appropriately comments. Apple's account indicates that this policy was not inadvertent, something that the U.S. command "stumbled upon" in an "absent-minded way,"'" but rather was planned and understood in advance.
Neil Sheehan's widely discussed article on war crimes" makes the same point. Sheehan claims that "classified military documents specifically talk about bombing villages in communist-held areas 'to deprive the enemy of the population resource."' He refers to a secret study in the summer of 1966 which proposed reconsideration of the policy of unrestricted bombing and shelling which was "urbanizing" the population.T This proposal was vetoed at the highest level of American authority in Saigon, he writes. It was decided instead to continue to employ "air and artillery to terrorize the peasantry and raze the countryside." One of the basic American tactics was "unrestricted air and artillery bombardments of peasant hamlets"-"devastation had become a fundamental element in [the American] strategy to win the war." The rural civilian population was the target of the American attack "because it was believed that their existence was important to the enemy." The idea was to defeat the Vietnamese communists "by obliterating their strategic base, the rural population. ' "s
The United States authorities have a point when they argue that My Lai is not the typical incident of the Vietnam war. More typical, almost a story of the war in microcosm, is the village of Phuqui on the Batangarn Peninsula, 180 miles southeast of Hue. In January 1969, 12,000 peasants in this region were forced from their homes in an American ground sweep, loaded on helicopters and shipped to interrogation centers and a waterless camp near Quang Ngai over which floated a banner saying "We thank you for liberating us from communist terror." According to official military statistics, there were 158 NVA and VC dead and 268 wounded in the six-month campaign of which this was a part. These refugees (who incidentally seem to have included the remnants of My Lai) had lived in caves and bunkers for 55. This occasionally-heard explanation is plainly absurd, even If we believe its original formulation by Samuel Huntington, The Bases of Accommodation, 46 FOnoGN AvAims 642 (1968). The Huntington article appeared prior to the massive escalation of the American bombing in the countryside of Indochina. But if the effects of millions of tons of bombs and thousands of square miles of defoliation could not have been predicted beforehand, which is difficult enough to believe, it was surely known by mid-1968.
6. See note 4 supra. 57. Cf. note 55 supra. 58. Sheehan, supra note 4, at 12, col. 4. months before the forced evacuation because of the heavy American bombing and artillery and naval shelling. A dike was "blasted by American jets to deprive the North Vietnamese of a food supply.6t9
As of April 1971, the dike had not been repaired: "As a result, the salt water of the South China Sea continues to submerge the fields where rice once grew." About 4000 refugees, including 1500 in Phuqui, have since returned. Phuqui is now surrounded by 10-foot rows of bamboo. It is under guard, and no one may enter or leave between 6:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. "The hills that overlook the flooded paddies, once scattered with huts, are 'ironed'-a word used by the peasants to mean filled with bomb fragments, mines and unexploded artillery shells. B-52 bomb craters nearly 20 feet deep pock the hills." One reason why the dike has not been rebuilt may be that-in the words of an American official-"two years ago the people on the peninsula were written off as communists. It would not be surprising if the attitudes still linger among the Vietnamese today." Most of the population go without basic food. "Province officials neither affirm nor deny police action to limit the peasants' rice ... It has long been a practice to control the supply of South Vietnam's food, however, to insure that the Vietcong cannot eat excess peasant food." An American working in the province said, "You might say that Phuqui has been forgotten."
Forgotten it has been, along with hundreds of other villages like it. The American war in Indochina is a record of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a record of mounting horror. 02 About one acre in six has been sprayed by defoliants. In many areas, there are no signs of recovery. Crop destruction is done largely with an arsenical compound which may remain in the soil for years and is not cleared for use on crops in the United States. A contaminant in the herbicides, dioxin, is known to be a highly potent agent causing birth defects in mammals. Through 1969, one-half million acres of forest had been destroyed by giant tractors with Rome plow blades, widely used in other areas as well. These areas are scraped bare. Nothing may grow again. Arthur Westing, biologist, former Marine officer and director of the Herbicide Assessment Commission of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, writes that "we may well be altering drastically and detrimentally the ecology of vast acreages of South Vietnam." ' ' "These vegetational wastelands will remain one of the legacies of our presence for decades to come" 6 --perhaps permanently.
The effects of these policies on the population can be easily imagined. Hunger and starvation from crop destruction and forced population removal have been noted since 1961. Bryce Nelson, an LA. Times reporter who was formerly a reporter for Science, writes that an unreleased report of the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission notes the death of ninety people within a four month period (September to December 1970) from exposure to spraying and drinking water contaminated with herbicides. Village Voice, January 28, 1971, at 15, col. S. A former IVS worker with four years experience in South Vietnam reports "numerous encounters" with farmers in Cantho and Tayninh provinces whose crops were destroyed. He also reports seeing patients in Ta)ninh hospital "with limbs and faces burned mercilessly by phosphorous" and "child after child scarred or disfigured in some hideous way" in hospitals in the Mekong Delta. Letter to the Editor from Roger Montgomery, N.Y. Times. Jan. 22, 1971. at 28, cols. 5-6. removed-often by force-into controlled areas, by the early 1960s. After 1965, air and artillery bombardment and ground sweeps accounted for the overwhelming majority of the refugees.
In South Vietnam, perhaps half the population has been killed, maimed or driven from their homes. In Laos, perhaps a quarter of the population of about three million are refugees. Another third live under some of the most intense bombardment in history. Refugees report that they lived in caves and tunnels, under bombing so intensive that not even a dog could cross a path without being attacked by an American jet. Whole villages were moved repeatedly into tunnels deeper and deeper in the forest as the scope of the bombing was extended. The fertile Plain of Jars in Northern Laos was finally cleared and turned into a free-fire zone. These refugees, incidentally, report that they rarely saw NVA troops and that Pathet Lao soldiers were rarely to be found in the villages. The areas in question are far from South Vietnam or the "Ho Chi Minh Trails." In Cambodia, the Kennedy subcommittee estimated that by September, 1970-after four months of regular bombardment-there were about a million refugees out of a population of about six million. The intensive bombardment also has been reported by captured correspondents. According to Richard Dudman's direct observations in captivity, "[t]he bombing and shooting was radicalizing the people of rural Cambodia and was turning the countryside into a massive, dedicated, and effective revolutionary base." 0 ' 6 As elsewhere in Indochina, this is both a consequence and a cause of the American bombardment. On April 21, 1971, Rep. Paul McCloskey, just returned from Indochina, testified before the Kennedy subcommittee that an Air Force lieutenant colonel at Udom Air Force Base in Thailand said that "there just aren't any villages in Northern Laos anymore, or in southern North Viet Nam either, for that matter." Government reports, secret until unearthed with great effort by McCloskey, confirm the overwhelming evidence of refugee reports concerning the virtual destruction of large areas of rural Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. Quang Nam, American and allied forces had destroyed and razed 307 of the original 555 hamlets of the province." He adds, "I was flown over square mile after square mile where every village, home, and treeline had been burned to the ground; this was part of a rice denial and search and destroy program admittedly based on the need to deny the Vietcong the ability to obtain food, hospitalization, cover and concealment which the villages would otherwise afford." 68 The United States Army Field Manual permits measures to "destroy, through chemical or bacterial agents harmless to man, crops intended solely for consumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be determined). ' 6 8 a Yet the descriptions of crop destruction cited above, and those of the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission, suggest that nearly all of the food destroyed would have been consumed by civilians. It should be remembered that Goering was convicted at Nuremberg for crimes against humanity in part because of orders requiring diversion of food from occupied territories to German needs, and that the United States in Tokyo also supported prosecution of Japanese military officials for crop destruction in China. 0 The province that McCloskey described, Quang Nam, is the subject of a book by the former Senior AID official in the province, William Nighswonger. 70 He explains that "the battle for Quang Nam was lost by the government to Viet-Cong forces recruited for the most part from within the province." A major reason for their success was "the progressive social and economic results" shown by their programs. As elsewhere in Indochina, it was the success of the communist-led forces in gaining popular support through successful programs 7 the American effort to destroy the rural society in which the revolution was rooted.
Robert Shaplen concludes that "the war's overall effects on the Vietnamese have been cataclysmically destructive, not only in physical terms but psychologically and socially." 12 Furthermore, these effects are overwhelmingly attributable to American firepower and tactics.
Unless one assumes a high degree of idiocy on the part of the American command and the civilian leadership in Washington, it is necessary to suppose that something of the sort was anticipated when these tactics were designed. Furthermore, there is mounting evidence, some of it just cited, that the probable effects were understood in advance, and were even intended. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that these tactics, though sharply intensified in 1965 and again in 1968, can be traced back to the early 1960s. In fact the Diem regime, installed and kept in power by the United States, initiated a virtual war on peasant supporters of the Vietminh in the mid-1950sY 3 In the face of such evidence, which has by now been recorded at great length in many easily accessible sources, it requires a real act of faith to doubt that the American command and the civilian authorities are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the sense of Nuremberg. In fact, it is difficult to understand the surprise or concern over My Lai, considering the relative triviality of this incident in the context of the overall American policies in Indochina.
Taylor observes, correctly and appropriately, that "[t]he war, in the massive, lethal dimensions it acquired after 1964, was the work of highly educated academics and administrators"-the Kennedy advisers, the Rusks, McNamaras, Bundys and Rostows, who stayed on with President Johnson and "who must bear major responsibility for the war and the course it took." 74 The same is true of the war in the years 1961-64, with its lethal effects-small, to be sure, compared with what was to come, but nonetheless hardly acceptable by civilized standards.
It remains to discuss two essential points: first, the argument that the American actions were permitted by "military necessity," and second, the claim that U.S. intervention was justified in collective (1970 
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The Rule of Force in International Affairs self-defense against armed attack, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Taylor discusses both of these matters, but in what seems to me an unsatisfactory way.
III. Military Necessity
In a sense, it is correct that the American policy of "no villages, no guerrillas" was based on military necessity. American planners were well aware of the enormous popular support for the communist-led resistance forces, the so-called 'Vietcong', and the lack of any significant popular base for the government." Furthermore, there is no great secret as to why the Vietcong were so successful in gaining popular support.
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The Field Operations Coordinator of the U.S. Operations Mission, John Paul Vann, circulated a report 77 in 1965 on how the war should be fought. His premises were that a social revolution was in process in South Vietnam, "primarily identified with the National Liberation Front," and that "a popular political base for the Government of South Vietnam does not now exist." "The dissatisfaction of the agrarian population... today is largely expressed through alliance with the NLF," he wrote. "The existing government is oriented toward the exploitation of the rural and lower class urban populations." Since it is "naive," he explained, to expect that "an unsophisticated, relatively illiterate, rural population [will] recognize and oppose the evils of Communism," the United States must institute "effective political indoctrination of the population" under an American-maintained "autocratic government." The document opposes mere reliance on gadgetry, air power, and artillery, and rejects the expressed view of a United States officer who stated, "if these people want to stay there and support the Communists, then they can expect to be bombed." The report is based on the further assumption that the social revolution is "not incompatible" with United States aims, but that "the aspirations of the majority" can only be realized "through a non-Communist government." According to Vann, the United States should be the judge of what would be "best" for the unsophisticated peasants of Vietnam. The United States, he argued, must impose "a benevolently inclined autocracy or dictatorship... while laying the foundation for a democratically oriented [government] ." Vann's report expresses the benevolent face of imperialism. It is outspoken in its colonialist assumptions. From Taylor's few remarks on the subject, one might surmise that he would agree with Vann's proposals and leading assumptions.
As already noted, Taylor accepts the legitimacy of the effort to "gain and hold the political allegiance of the South Vietnamese to a non-Com. munist government," 78 while doubting the possibility of doing so. He regards faulty judgment and over-reliance on military means as the primary defects of American policy.' 0 9 He accuses United States authorities of "under-maintenance": too much bombing and not enough concentration on the "civil half."so He raises no objection to the direct use of force in the early 1960s or to the support of large-scale terror in the late 1950s in the interest of maintaining the regime that the United States had installed."' Nowhere does he raise the fundamental question: Is it legitimate for the United States to use its power to impose a particular social and political order on some foreign land, supposing that it can do so within the limits of "proportionality" of force applied? His discussion of the intentions of American leaders is unsatisfactory in part because of his failure to raise this question. Thus Taylor argues that to accuse "our leaders" of being war criminals "as. sumes that the leaders wanted things to turn out as they have, whereas in fact it is plain that those responsible are exceedingly dissatisfied with the present consequences of their policies." 82 Taylor's point can be saved from incoherence only by the assumption that the intentions of American leaders-specifically, to win support for the government they had installed-are legitimate and benign, and that these leaders can be faulted only for having made errors of judgment along the way. Surely Taylor would not argue that the defendants at Nuremberg should have been acquitted merely because they, too, were "dissatisfied with the consequences of their policies."
Taylor believes that some of the American failures in Vietnam can be traced to the fact that "the armed services no longer possess leaders of stature and influence comparable to the heroes of the Second World War." ' This is an unfair criticism. The difference between World War II and Vietnam has to do with the character of the wars, not the character of the military commanders. The military in both wars was entrusted with implementation of the policies laid down by the civilian leadership. In the case of Vietnam, this was the policy of "gain[ing] and hold[ing] the political allegiance of the South Vietnamese to a non-Communist government." To implement this policy effectively, the military command was compelled to abandon the benevolent imperialist pose and to destroy the rural society, the social base of the revolution. The civilian leadership was well aware of what was taking place and made no effort to change policy.
Ambassador Robert W. Komer, chief pacification adviser to the GVN in 1967-68, explains that "U.S. military intervention had averted final collapse of the coup-ridden GVN and had created a favorable military environment in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again.""' The United States escalation overcame the difficulty that there was "little GVN administration... outside Saigon," and made it possible ultimately to initiate the "comprehensive" and "massive" 1967-70 pacification program in an effort to cope with what was dearly "a revolutionary, largely political conffict." 85 Despite the qualms of the benevolent imperialists such as Vann, it is difficult to see how this aim could have been achieved except through the means employed, namely, what Komer describes as "massive U.S. military intervention at horrendous cost." 88 In this sense, it can be argued that the horrendous cost of the American military intervention-including defoliation, forced population removal, bombing, harrassment and interdiction, free-fire zones, andpersonnel weapons, the Phoenix program of assassination and terror, 7 86. Komer, supra note 84, at 49, 50, 55. These benevolent imperialists, it should be noted, did not dissociate themselves from United States policies despite their reservations even after the grim effects were obvious. See note 24 supra.
87. The Phoenix program is "aimed at neutralizing the clandestine Vietcong politicoadministrative apparatus, which many regard as the key to their insurgent capabilities." Komer, supra note 84, at 53. "Neutralization" is bureaucratese for "assamssination or capture." Estimates as to the numbers "neutralized" vary. Deputy United States Ambassador, William E. Colby, principal United States official in charge of pacification, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that close to 20,000 were "neutralized" in 1969, of whom 6,187 were killed. For comparison, the Saigon government claims that 4,619 the torture of prisoners to gain information-was a military necessity, and thus no crime if military necessity justifies departure from the language of international agreements. All of this is arguable given the essential premise that the United States was justified in intervening by force in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" to guarantee the rUle of the regime it had originally imposed in 1954 and its successorsthe rule of the landholding and urban elite, the military officers, and the Northern Catholics who provided the social base for a regime that was clearly incapable of holding out on its own against a domestic insurgency.
The question whether this premise is valid arises in its sharpest form in the pre-1965 period with which Taylor does not concern himself. By 1965, as Vann noted, 8 8 these questions of principle were largely irrelevant. After the "large scale participation by U.S. ground forces," he wrote, "it is almost inconceivable that the United States will withdraw from Vietnam short of a military victory or a negotiated settlement that assures the autonomy of South Vietnam." 89 The same view was held by civilians close to the Administration, including some who were later to become outspoken doves. Thus Richard Goodwin wrote in 1966 that continued American combat was justified by "the bedrock vital interest of the United States" which must serve as the "single standard" for policy formation, namely, "to establish that American military power, once committed to defend another nation, 0 0 cannot be driven from the field." 0 1
Even today, it is well understood by the American command that military force must be used to destroy the political movement that the civilians were killed by "the enemy" in 1969. The Phoenix program of course ac. counts for only a small fraction of the civilians killed by combined American-GVN forces.
Len Ackland, a former IVS worker in South Vietnam and then a team leader and analyst for RAND, points out that the Phoenix program is designed to capture or murder civilians: "people who serve the political party, the National Liberation Front, as tax collectors, clerks, postmen, etc." For references and further documentation, see N. ClioMsKY, AT WAR WrrH ASIA 301-02 (1970); HERMAN, supra note 73, at 46-47.
88. See note 77 supra. 89. The latter phrase is a code-term, in American political terminology, for rule of South Vietnam by a non-communist government. The NLF political program of 1962, largely ignored-even suppressed-in the United States, called for the neutralization of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. One might argue that this was a deception, but it is unclear that the United States has unilateral authority to use military force in acting on its skepticism.
90. This is another formulation of the inexpressible statement that South Vietnam must be ruled by the American-imposed non-communist government. Goodwin was well aware, and explains in this book, that the insurgency even at that time wag overwhelmingly domestic. Saigon regime has never been able to defeat politically. A special intelligence survey ordered by General John H. Cushman, top American official in the Mekong Delta, warns that the enemy is expanding his political network and "reverting to a political-struggle phase."" -William Colby adds that "we need to prevent the enemy from putting in this network, because that will permit the Communists to revive later on.' ' m 3 Once again, given the premise that the United States has the right to intervene to impose the regime of its choice, "military necessity" could justify the continued use of overwhelming military force against the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the rural Cambodians as well.
R. GOODWIN, TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY 38 (1966)
It should be added that the premise that American military intervention in other nations' affairs is justified is solidly enshrined in American history. Taylor refers to the American conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. Whatever "idealistic" motives McKinley may have professed, the fact is that the United States overcame a domestic popular movement by force and terror, at tremendous cost to the native inhabitants. Seventy years later, the peasantry-three quarters of the population-still lives under material conditions not very different from those of the Spanish occupation.0 4 In Thailand, a postwar effort at parliamentary democracy led by the liberal democrat Pridi Phanomyong was overthrown by a military coup that reinstituted the Japanese collaborator who had declared war on the United States. Substantial and continuing American assistance has supported a terroristic regime that has willingly integrated itself into the American-Japanese Pacific system. Pridi, who had fought with the American O.S.S. against the Japanese during World War II, found his way to China. In Korea in 1945, the United States overthrew an already established popular regime, making use of Japanese troops and collaborators. By 1949 the American command had succeeded in destroy- ing the existing unions, the popular local councils, and all popular indigenous groups, and had instituted a right-wing dictatorship of the wealthy elite and military-police forces--employing ample terror in the process.
Vietnam is exceptional only because these familiar objectives have been so difficult to achieve. The goal in Vietnam remains: to concentrate and control the population, separating it from main force guerrilla units, and to create a dependent economy that adapts itself to the needs and capacities of the industrialized societies of the West (and Japan), under the rule of wealthy collaborators, with a mere pretense of democracy. As to the peasants, one can recall the words of a South Vietnamese writer speaking of the period of French domination: "the peasants [can] grit their teeth and nurse their hatred amidst the paddy fields." 95 And the residents of the miserable urban slums can do the same. This is in fact the model of national and social development that the benevolent imperialists such as Vann offer to underdeveloped societies, whether they are aware of it or not. It is to achieve such magnificent results as these that they are willing to subject the population of Indochina, allegedly for their own good, to the benefits of American technology, as has been done in Vietnam for the past decade.
IV. Aggression and Collective Self-Defense
The final matter to be considered is what Taylor describes as the "salient feature" of Nuremberg, namely the issue of crimes against peace. As Taylor observes, the justification for the American intervention in Vietnam can only be Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Invocation of this Article assumes that the United States is engaged in collective self-defense against an armed attack from North Vietnam. There has been extensive discussion of this matter. It is curious that Taylor barely alludes to it and makes no effort to deal with arguments that have been repeatedly presented in legal and historical literature. 8 1967) . There has been no attempt to respond to Draper's devastating critique of Administration claims regarding the North Vietnamese troop involvement in the South. The astonishing internal contradictions sulfice in themselves to make the Government case unbelievable. See also the references in note 96 supra. Recall that this North Vietnamese battalion was allegedly detected in the South two and a half months after the regular bombing of North Vietnam had been initiated, eight and a half months after the first bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam in a "reprisal" for an inddent which probably never occurred. The Government claims regarding North Vietnamese aggression in Laos and Cambodia are no more compelling. ScajoLAR.s, Fall 1970, vol. 2, no. 4 , at 80.
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TnE PExTAGON PAPms, supra note 14, provides new information relevant to North Vietnamese troop commitment. The first report that North Vietnamese troops had entered "into the order of battle" appears in a CIA memorandum of April 2r, 1965, referTing to a regiment of the 325th Division, which had been reported as possibly in the area since February. This regiment allegedly was operating In northwestern Kontum Province in 11 Corps. Evidently, the evidence was not very compelling. As late as July 2, 1965, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton expressed his concern "about the increasing probability that there are regular PAVN forces either In the II Corps area or in Laos directly across the border from II Corps." The documents also reveal that in late April a United States force level of 82,000 along with 7,250 "third country" troops was approved, and that General Westmoreland's request of June 7 for 44 battalions (a total force level of almost 194,000) was approved on July 30.
the new escalation with a White Paper, which, Cooper notes, "proved to be a dismal disappointment." The problem was that "the actual findings [regarding North Vietnamese involvement] seemed pretty frail." No regular troops could be identified. As for infiltrators, even if allegedly "known" and "probable" infiltrators were combined, the average southward movement beginning in 1959, when the insurrection was already solidly in progress, was "little more than 9000 per year," which did not "loom very large" as compared with the one-half millionman Saigon army and the 23,000 regular American troops deployed. "The information on enemy weapons," he observed, "was even less earth-shaking." The three 75mm. recoilless rifles of Chinese communist origin, forty-six Soviet-made rifles, forty submachine guns and one automatic pistol of Czech origin that had been captured (and that might have been bought on the open market) did not seem too impressive as compared with over $860 million in military assistance given by the U.S. to the Saigon government since 1961.0 9 In fact, the weapons of communist origin constituted less than two and one-half per cent of the captured weapons, as I. F. Stone noted at the time. 100 As to the infiltrators, the figures seem even less impressive when we recall that so far as is known, these were overwhelmingly South Viet. namese returning to their homes. It is difficult to see why this should be impermissible, after the subversion of the Geneva agreements and the American and Saigon violations of the Geneva Accords, 101 the Diemist repression, and the renewal of guerrilla war in the South in 1957. Furthermore, Cooper makes no mention of the "infiltration" of trained South Vietnamese into South Vietnam by the United States after training at American military bases; nor, for that matter, of the saboteur groups and guerrilla teams of South Vietnamese infiltrated to 99. C. COOPER, supra note 97, at 264-65. 100. Stone, A Reply to the White Paper, I.F. Stone's Weekly, March 8, 1965, at 1, col. 1. 101. "It appears from the International Control Commission's reports that through February 28, 1961, about 154 violations had been registered against the South and only one violation against the North." R. SCIGLIANO, supra note 20, at 154. Sclgliano argues that the North has the advantage of being "more acute, or devious" and that the "inability of ICC teams to perform their duties . . . is much greater in North than In South Vietnam." R. SCIGuIANO, supra note 20, at 155. Perhaps. However, one ICC Report states: "As has been revealed in the preceding paragraphs, the degree of co.operation given to the Commission by the two parties has not been the same. While the Commission has experienced difficulties in North Vietnam, the major part of its difficulties has arisen III All in all, the case that the U.S. was merely exercising the inherent right of collective self-defense against an armed attack from North Vietnam is frail indeed. Yet one who defends the legitimacy of the American involvement must go beyond even this and claim that the United States had the right to determine unilaterally that there had been "aggression from the North" and to escalate its already substantial military involvement in South Vietnam, by-passing the stipulations in the United Nations Charter concerning the role of the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to peace. Unless all of this is accepted, one must conclude that the American military actions are illegal, and themselves constitute aggression-that there was aggression not from the north, but from the east.
Unfortunately, Taylor has virtually nothing to say about these frequently-debated questions. His treatment of the matter of aggression is, in general, unsatisfying. In discussing the allegation that North Vietnam is guilty of aggression in South Vietnam, Taylor points to "strong evidence." "Indisputably, the ground fighting has all taken place in South Vietnam," not in North Vietnam. But, he argues, the case is not dear, since the Geneva Agreements merely established two "zones" and explicitly declared the military demarcation line to be "provisional" and not "a political or territorial boundary."' 0 Furthermore, South Vietnam, with United States support, declined to proceed with the scheduled elections. Of course, if it is unclear whether North Vietnam is guilty of aggression, it is correspondingly unclear whether American military action is justified by Article 51, which in fact speaks not of "aggression," but of "armed attack," a narrower category. 1 0 ' Furthermore, the "strong evidence" that Taylor cites and questions cuts other ways as well. But these charges constitute only part of the case. A much more serious charge is that the United States has engaged in aggressive warfare in South Vietnam in violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning the use of force. These charges are based on military actions taken against an insurgency which the United States recognized to be popular and successful-far more popular than the government it had installed and maintained, which had lost the war by 1965 despite the absence of any regular North Vietnamese troops. Taylor does not mention these matters, I presume, because of his tacit assumption that the United States had the right to intervene with its ground, helicopter and air forces in what some American authorities have recognized to be a "revolutionary, largely political conflict." 100 It might be argued that the stipulations of the United Nations Charter regarding the threat or use of force (specifically, Article 2(4)) have been so eroded as to be effectively inoperative. The issue is discussed by Thomas M. Franck in a recent study. 100 He discusses "the changed realities of the postwar quarter-century" that have so shattered the precepts of Article 2(4) that "only the words remain." 110 Franck is surely right in arguing that "both super-Powers have succeeded in establishing norms of conduct within their regional organizations which have effectively undermined Article 2(4),"111 beginning with the insis. tion in the particular way he does, Franck takes his stand, without argu. ment or even explicit assertion, on the side of the great powers. This bias is only partially mitigated by his later references to a third factor in the erosion of Article 2(4), namely, "the increased authoritarianism of regional systems dominated by a super-Power.
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A similar bias appears when Franck refers to the "significant support" 1 19 given to indigenous communist insurgents by China in Laos and South Vietnam, for example. He cites no evidence. The available evidence indicates that Chinese aid has always been small as compared to that given by the United States and its allies to the right-wing forces. Franck's reference to propaganda as a form of intervention hardly applies in this case. China's position has generally been that wars of national liberation must be indigenous and cannot rely on China for substantive material support. Incidentally, so far as is known, the only Chinese troops fighting in the Indochina war are the Chinese Nationalist troops employed by the United States, particularly in clandestine operations in Laos.
The same questions are begged when Franck asserts that "the smallscale and diffuse but significant and frequent new wars of insurgency have, by their nature, made clearcut distinctions between aggression and self-defense.. . exceedingly difficult. '120 Thus he points out that it strains credulity "to be told that Poland had attacked Germany or South Korea the North,"' 12 but in the case of wars of national liberation, "it is often difficult even to establish convincingly"' 22 who is the aggressor. He might have used a different analogy. It would strain credulity to be told that Hungary attacked the Soviet Union in 1956, or that the Philippines attacked the United States at the turn of the century, or that the American colonies attacked England in 1776. If one takes the view that wars of national liberation and great power interventions constitute a continuation of the classic pattern, to be sure with certain modifications, then these are more appropriate analogies, and there is nothing strikingly new about the postwar period.
As to the outside support for wars of national liberation, recall the vast support given by the French to the American colonies in the revolutionary war. There is no question but that the American Revolutionary War, when considered as a 'normal' insurgency, entirely fits the bill of the many revolutionary wars which afflict the middle of the twentieth century. Shorn of almost two centuries of 4th-of-July oratory, it was a military operation fought by a very small armed minority -at almost no time did Washington's forces exceed 8,000 men in a country which had at least 300,000 able-bodied males-and backed by a force of 31,897 French ground troops and 12,660 sailors and Marines manning sixty-one major vessels. 1 2 Even compensating for the effect of 4th-of-July oratory, we would have no difficulty in evaluating the bias of a contemporary British writer who referred to the American revolution, in Franck's terms, as a war of agitation, infiltration and subversion carried on by proxy through a national liberation movement. Taking Fall's point of view, which I believe to be much closer to accuracy than the position implicit in Franck's discussion, we must conclude that there is no strikingly new factor in the postwar era that led to the erosion of Article 2(4). Rather, one must agree with U Thant, I believe, when he says, in words that Franck quotes: "In the final analysis there can be no solid foundation for peace in the world so long as the super-Powers insist on taking unilateral military action whenever they claim to see a threat to their security"1 4 --or, we may add, a threat to the perceived self-interest of dominant social groups.
While it is beyond question that what remains of Article 2(4) is "only the words," there seems no reason to suppose that this is any change from earlier norms or that it is a consequence of changes in world affairs that could not have been foreseen by the framers of the United Nations Charter. There is, furthermore, no reason to accept the conclusion that the precepts of Article 2(4) should not be considered applicable. Of course, these precepts suffer from the absence of an enforcing authority, which is a general defect of international law.
The question of the right of intervention and the threat or use of force by the great powers to impose social and political arrangements in developing countries should be at the forefront of any investigation of Vietnam, whether in the light of Nuremberg or in a broader historical context. By failing even to raise such questions, Taylor reduces his discussion to marginal significance, it seems to me. For future policy decisions, these are surely the major issues. In a dozen places in the world the United States is providing military support to regimes that are attempting to suppress internal insurgency, in ways that might lead to direct military intervention.
1 25 It can be plausibly argued that in Greece it is the American military support for the Colonels that prevents a popular insurgency. In much of Latin America, the same is true.
Almost all Latin American regimes can now suppress rural insur. rections of willful foes. Because of a number of factors, none is as weak as Fulgencio Batista's government of the 1950s. U.S. AID's Public Safety Division has trained police as a first line of defense against terrorism in at least 14 republics; armies are better equipped as $1.75 billion in U.S. military aid has poured into the Americas; upward of 20,000 latino officers and enlisted men have trained at Ft. Gulick in the Canal Zone, and now available are new antiguerrilla weapons developed in Vietnam, which run the gamut from specially designed helicopters to body smellers. 120 These remarks recall the observation of General Maxwell Taylor in 1963 that in Vietnam "we have a going laboratory where we see subversive insurgency... being applied in all its forms." The Pentagon, recognizing "the importance of the area as a laboratory," had already sent "teams out there looking at the equipment requirements of this kind of guerrilla warfare."' 2 7 There is considerable evidence, in fact, that the United States has exploited Vietnam as a laboratory for counterinsurgency, testing weapons and tactics for the wars it anticipates in much the same way that other powers used Spain in 1936-39.1" S Among the Latin American regimes that are using the technology designed in the Vietnam laboratory for countering insurgency, there are several that owe their existence to interference from the United States. In Guatemala, a promising reform-minded regime was overthrown by United States subversion in 1954. For the past several years there has been a virtual bloodbath, as some 4000 peasants were killed indiscrim. inately, in the course of an anti-communist extermination campaign, 
